AMBUSH ON HIGHWAY 22 The Truckers of the 48th Transportation Group proved The Army's credo that all soldiers can fight as Infantrymen when the situation demands. By Stephen C. Turnnell   The village of Ap Nhi is located 40 miles northwest of Saigon in Tay Ninh province, on a narrow strip of land between the Vam Co River and Highway 22, one of the main routes into Cambodia. The highway runs north through Ap Nhi to the provincial capital of Tay Ninh City and south to Saigon. In this area of South Vietnam, known as the piedmont, or Mekong Terrace, it rains every night during the summer months. During the evening of August 25, 1968, it rained exceptionally hard on the little village of Ap Nhi- as if nature were trying to wash away what had happened earlier that day.   Just before noon on August 25, a large convoy from the 48th Transportation Group at Long Binh, on its way to the 1st Brigade, U.S. 25th Infantry Division, base camped at Tay Ninh City, was ambushed as it passed through Ap Nhi. The lead trucks in the convoy had just cleared the village when the enemy opened up with rocket propelled grenades (RPG's), machine guns and small arms fire from a thick stand of rubber trees. A bitter nine-hour battle followed as VC and NVA infantry tried to outflank and overrun the stalled column of trucks.   At the time of the ambush I was serving with the 10yh Company, 48th Trans. Group. The 48th was responsible for transport operations in the III and IV corps tactical zones and delivering supplies to numerous base camps. All of the 48th routes were perilous, but possibly the most risky assignment was the Tay Ninh run. The Tay Ninh base camp was just 7 miles from the Cambodian boarder and the Ho Chi Minh Trail, near the center of an area MACV had designated as war zone C. The area was long acknowledged as a VC stronghold. The trip to Tay Ninh took convoys through the zone and towards Nui Ba Den, the mysterious "Black Virgin Mountain," a solitary black knob rising 985 meters above an otherwise flat plain.   Because it was neither jungle nor delta, the terrain in these provinces northwest of Saigon allowed for easy movement of vehicles even during the monsoon rains, and both sides used the region as a headquarters area. The 25th Infantry Divisions main base camp was just north of the town of Cu Chi, in an area known as the Cu Chi District.   Also within the district's 450 square mile area were three VC military and political headquarters. Just as terrain and soil features in these provinces facilitated transport operations above ground, they also created ideal conditions for operating below ground. A maze of tunnels housed VC hospitals, air raid shelters, barracks, munitions factories and storage caches. Digging in the subsurface laterite clay was never easy, but it made strong tunnel walls that required a minimum of shoring work.   The tunnels were part of a network of hundreds of miles of passageways and chambers from which the VC could launch attacks against their enemies. Today Cu Chi's tunnels, which were also used during the First Indochina War are a tourist attraction, but during the Vietnam War the district was one of the most frequently bombed and napalmed areas in the country.   Just beyond Cu Chi, near the village of Trang Bang, was abridge over the Suoi Sau or Sau Creek. So many convoys had been ambushed in the area that American troops had sardonically dubbed it "Suoi Cide" - Suicide Bridge. At Go Dau Ha, eight miles from Trang Bang, the highway split, with Highway 1 running west and Highway 22 running northwest toward Tay Ninh, Six miles farther north from Go Dau Ha was Ap Nhi, within easy striking distance of the Cu Chi tunnels and the Ho Chi Minh Trail.   Convoy and road security were usually a high priority with MACV, since disruptions in supply lines naturally caused problems in the field. But on occasion matters of security were left to regional commanders. Colonel Duquesne "Duke" Wolf, commanding the 1st Brigade of the 25th Division at Tay Ninh, had the responsibility of securing Highway 22 from Go Dau Ha to Tay Ninh in August 1968. Wolf assumed command that month, as did a new division commander, Maj. Gen. Ellis W. Williamson. Since late July 1st Brigade Intelligence had been reporting that an offensive against Tay Ninh was imminent and should probably be expected in early August. Route 22 was a major VC/NVA infiltration route into Saigon, and any enemy drive on the capital city would likely have to first pass through Wolf's area of operations.   Colonel Wolf immediately realized that his brigade was understrength in men and material and began requesting more of both. MACV, however, maintained that Saigon, and not Tay Ninh, would be the target of the next assault, as it had been in the recent TET and May offensives. Wolf's requests were repeatedly refused.   The base at Tay Ninh already depended heavily upon convoy supply, but by this point Wolf was short of Helicopters, which meant he had to depend upon trucks even more than usual. Similarly, the shortage of air support put the increased number of Tay Ninh bound convoys in greater danger. Except for a Cessna L-19 "Bird Dog" a fixed wing observation aircraft, the August 25 Ap Nhi convoy had no air cover at all, not even an occasional flyover by Cobra gunships.   The Saigon generals were right about a coming assault, but so was Colonel Wolf's 1st Brigade Intel. The offensive began August the 17th with rocket and mortar attacks against several towns and U.S. bases. Captured documents indicated that Saigon and Da Nang were the ultimate objectives, but the strategy was to draw U.S. forces away from those urban centers by launching attacks in nearby provinces. In the Da Nang and Tay Ninh areas the attacks were intense and accompanied by heavy enemy troop movement. The offensive quickly faded around Da Nang as it did in some other areas. But in Tay Ninh province the fighting was prolonged for weeks as Communist forces tried to push through to Saigon.   On the evening of the 17th, Colonel Wolf's troops surprised a battalion-size enemy force moving towards Tay Ninh City. It took several hours of heavy fighting to push them back. Later that night FSB Buell II, 4 miles north of town, came under heavy attack, as did the U.S. communications compound atop nearby Nui Ba Den. VC and NVA troops, probably from the 5th and 9th VC/NVA divisions, threw themselves fiercely, at both positions in the face of overwhelming U.S. firepower. Sometimes charging directly into point blank artillery fire. It was clear to the Americans that if the mountain were taken; the enemy would enjoy the benefit of excellent observation for miles around.   By dawn on the 18th, fighting in both areas had temporarily ceased. Communist forces had failed to occupy Tay Ninh City and take Nui Ba Den, but they had been driven from the province. Sporadic clashes occurred during the next several days. Colonel Wolf's mechanized infantry patrolled continually during the day light hours, returning to their firebases at night, but the VC and NVA did not march down highways in daylight. One week after the attack on FSB Buell II, a battalion from the 88th NVA Regiment that was heavily reinforced with VC troops moved into position at night in the rubber trees along the roadside near Ap Nhi and waited for a target.   The decentralized nature of MACV's command structure permitted division commander's wide latitude and freedom of action regarding tactics and operational strategy. It was a situation that could result in communications problems, since important intelligence information was not always shared between commands, and sometimes not even within commands. In this case, although a major offensive had been underway in Tay Ninh province for more than a week, an offensive about which the 48th Trans Group Intel must certainly have been aware. There were no briefings provided to convoy drivers bound for Tay Ninh on Aug. 25 to warn them about heavy enemy activity in the area. The drivers were not warned to be extra alert, or that they should carry more than the basic issue of 100 rounds of ammunition per man. All was quiet at the truckers post at Long Binh, so the truck drivers, unaware of the extent of the August offensive or its impact on the Tay Ninh-Cu Chi area, thought that their trip to Tay Ninh on the 25th would be a routine mission.   By first light on August 25th, the trucks had begun to move out of the staging area at Long Binh. The convoy formed into three march units. Refrigerator trucks, or "reefers" always led, which allowed them to avoid dust stirred up by the convoy but put them first in line for ambush or road mines. Those carrying fuel and ammo were placed at the rear, so that in case of attack other trucks would not be blocked by burning, or exploding cargo. Six reefers from the 10th Trans Co. led the 81vehicle convoy up Highway 8A toward Cu Chi. Convoy security consisted mainly of eight ¼ ton trucks with M60 machineguns mounted atop them. Around 0800 hours, as the convoy approached Checkpoint 28 about five miles east of Cu Chi base camp, the first truck in the column hit a mine. The blast blew the right rear duels off the tracker and left the driver badly shaken but unhurt. I pick him up, and my truck now became the lead vehicle.   The convoy stopped briefly at the Cu Chi base, then reformed into two march units and left for Tay Ninh at around 1000 hrs. The column inched along at the mandated speed of 20 mph over Sui-cide Bridge, headed toward Trang Bang and the intersection at Go Dau Ha. Six miles farther up the road was Ap Nhi and its rubber forest. The trees belonged to the huge Ben Cui rubber plantation and extended a mile and a half along the highway and as much as four miles deep. The rubber trees grew to within 15 meters of the roadway, up to a berm that ran along the shoulder of the road the entire length of the grove. Apparently no one in a position of authority had realized that this was an excellent cover and concealment for the waiting enemy troops.   By 1150 hrs the lead trucks had passed the village. The U.S. Army drivers met with what looked like a column of ARVN infantrymen moving single file down the right side of the road, facing the convoy. After most of the first march unit had made it passed the rubber trees, the infantrymen turned and opened fire on the trucks. The troops were actually VC wearing ARVN uniforms, and their action was the signal for the main attack to begin. The plantation came alive with fire from automatic rifles, machine guns, grenades, rockets and mortars. The sudden onslaught cut the American column in two and brought more than half the trucks to a halt. Thirty trucks escaped the trap, but 51 were caught in the kill zone, which was nearly a mile long.   When the drivers of the lead trucks heard the beginning of the attack, they were instinctively inclined to stop and leave their vehicles. There were standing orders for such situations. In an ambush, trucks that had cleared the kill zone were supposed to keep moving at an accelerated speed so as not to block the road. The convoy's military police escort immediately ordered the drivers, whom had escaped the attack, to accelerate and keep moving toward Tay Ninh.   The enemy fire was initially directed at all the vehicles equipped with machine guns and radios, as well as vehicles positioned at the convoy's front and rear, in an effort to block both ends of the column. Two fuel tankers at the front of the line were hit and started to burn, and in the rear at least two ammo trailers were on fire, their cargo of 105mm artillery rounds cooking off and exploding. Drivers and escort personnel were forced to leave their trucks and fight from ground positions on the left side of the highway.   Almost as soon as the column had come to a halt, the attackers had mounted a rushing assault on the drivers in an attempt to overrun them and gain vantage points from which direct flanking fire could be delivered against them. When the attackers came running out of the rubber trees, the truckers began returning fire from their hastily established defenses.   Sp/4 William Seay of the 62nd TC had been driving a truck that was carrying artillery powder charges. When the attack began, he immediately leaped from his truck and took cover in the road behind the left rear dual wheels of the truck behind him, driven by Sp/4 David M. Sellman, also of the 62nd TC. Sellman and one other man were about 20 feet away from Seay, behind the left trailer wheels.   Seay's position, in the middle of the road behind the tractor wheels, was closest to the enemy. He killed two NVA when they attempted to rush the trucks. All along the line the drivers held their ground until the attackers were pushed back behind the berm. Within minutes the initial charge had been blunted, but the battle was just beginning. In the following nine hours the enemy attempted to wipe out each of the small pockets of American convoy personnel concentrated along the roadway.   The Americans soon realized that they were being subjected not only to automatic weapons fire from the tree line and the berm, but also from snipers firing from the treetops. Seay spotted one of the snipers in a tree about 75 meters to his right front. Aiming around the right side of the truck tire, he fired a burst from his M16, killing the sniper. Minutes passed, and then a grenade thudded to the ground and rolled under the trailer within a few feet of Sellman, who was well aware that the trailer was loaded with 175mm artillery shells. Sellman later reported that Seay left his position without hesitation, exposing himself to intense fire in the open ground between the truck and trailer wheels, pick up the grenade and hurled it back across the road. Four NVA jumped from their cover and tried to run, but were killed when the grenade exploded.   Minutes later when another grenade landed close to Seay's group, Sellman kicked it off the road behind them. No sooner had the dust settled from that explosion than another grenade rolled under the trailer. Once again Seay left his covered position, picked it up and threw it back at the enemy. As Seay scrambled for the grenade, Sellman spotted an NVA trying to crawl through a fence and quickly dispatched him. Just as Seay returned to his cover he and Sellman killed two more enemy soldiers trying to crawl through the fence. A few seconds later an NVA bullet tore through the back of Seay's right hand, shattering a bone in his wrist. Yelling that he was hit and for Sellman to cover him, Seay ran back to the rear, looking for some help for his wound.   Sp/4 William Hinote was with this group on the roadside, which also included Lt. Howard Brockbank of the 62nd TC and about four others. Hinote later stated that when he first saw Seay, he had lost a lot of blood and was obviously in great pain but was bearing it without complaint. One man applied a sterile dressing to Seay's wound in an attempt to stop the bleeding. When that failed, Hinote fashioned a tourniquet from his fatigue shirt and wrapped it around Seay's shattered hand. Though faint from shock and loss of blood, Seay continued to encourage those around him. When Hinote expressed concern about his wound, Seay told him to "stay alive" and not worry about him. When a trucker fired a full clip of ammo from his M16 in one burst, Seay lightly admonished him, saying " Take it easy! Don't waste your ammo-we might run out. What will we do then, Stand up and fight them with our fists? I wouldn't be any good at that!"   Unable to use his weapon with his right hand, Seay laid down to rest in the roadside ditch while the others moved to a better firing position about 15 meters away. After half an hour, Hinote brought water to the wounded man and remained with him in the 3- foot-wide ditch, both men occasionally firing at enemy positions and waiting for the next rush. Suddenly, while Hinote's back was turned, Seay fired another burst of M16 fire. Seay had risen to a half crouch and was firing with his left hand at some NVA trying to cross the road. Hinote turned just in time to see 3 of the enemy fall backward over the berm. No more than 5 seconds later he turned again and saw Seay himself fall backwards struck in the head by a sniper's bullet. The man who had saved the lives of his fellow soldiers at least three times that day died instantly, without making a sound. On the day he died he had 60 days left in country.   Air strikes were called in that afternoon but proved to be largely ineffective. By 1430 hrs.  tanks and light fire teams were in the area, and by 1500 two infantry companies had been inserted into the ambush site. All were attempting to engage the enemy and relieve the beleaguered drivers, but full support, for the column, was precluded by the blocked road. The tanks could not pass, and the NVA were doing a good job of keeping the convoy personnel isolated from the relief force, although attempts were made to have medevac helicopters evacuate casualties.   At the head of the line another small group of drivers had taken cover in the roadside ditch. Heavy sniper fire kept them down throughout most of the firefight, but they did manage to prevent the VC and NVA from flanking the line and overrunning their position. Pfc. Arden Sonnenberg of the 10th TC was among this group. Two armored personnel carriers (APC's) that had been leading the original convoy should have moved back to help defend the Sonnenberg group once the attack began, but they had apparently disappeared. For 61/2 hours that small group of men remained pinned down in their shallow ditches, trading fire with the enemy across the road and desperately defending their left flank.   Arden Gene Sonnenberg was a blond, energetic 20-year-old from Kenosha Wis. He was outgoing and friendly, and he loved to talk of his passion for racing bicycles and motorcycles back home. His first experience on a convoy had been a trip to the Blackhorse camp at Long Giao, riding shotgun with me. During that convoy we had run into a delay caused by some fighting on Highway 1 near Xuan Loc, and we had passed the time as we usually did on such occasions-sitting under a trailer, talking and listening to the radio. As Sonnenberg lay in the roadside ditch at Ap Nhi, he may have thought longingly of the protection offered by the trailers. At around 1830, after lying there pinned down for most of the afternoon, Sonnenberg suddenly made a run for his trailer and scurried underneath. One of the other men in the group later reported that Sonnenberg had been under the trailer for about 15 minutes when a burst of machine gun fire hit him the chest. Twenty minutes later a medevac chopper picked him up, but he died enroute to the hospital at Tay Ninh. He had been in-country just three weeks.   Meanwhile, a squad from the 65th Engineer Battalion, out on a minesweeping operation, had come upon the rear of the convoy. Two APC's carrying a squad from the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (Mechanized) accompanied the engineers. When forced to stop as they reached the burning ammo trailers, they came under heavy fire from enemy snipers in the plantation. Each of the APC's carried a .50-caiber machine gun, but both guns were malfunctioning, so they returned fire with M60's, rifles and M79 grenades.   When their ammo ran low, engineer Sgt. Gregory Haley managed to crawl to one of the APC's and climb inside the open hatch door in search of additional ammo and two spare M60's. Haley soon found that one was useless, it had no trigger, and the other jammed as he opened fire. When he tried to remove the bandoleer and unjam the gun, the charging handle broke off in his hand. The group fought on for two more hours with what they had.   While the fight continued at the rear of the convoy, some of the drivers who had made it through to the Tay Ninh base camp were returning to the front of the column. Many of the cargo-laden trailers that had been left immobile in the road needed to be retrieved if possible. Five bobtails and a jeep escort took a back road to Ap Nhi so as to avoid as much of Highway 22 as possible. Such a small detail would have had little chance if attacked. There was still sporadic firing all along the line, but most of the forward portion of the ambush zone was under American control by the time the retrieval party arrived. Casualties were hurriedly evacuated, and as many trailers as possible were shuttled to the Tay Ninh base.   Light showers had fallen earlier in the day, but by 2000 it began to rain harder, halting chopper traffic. At around 2100 an armored cavalry troop arrived at the rear of the column to join the force still fighting there. By this time the U.S. 25th Infantry Division had nearly a battalion committed to the battle, but they, too, had spent much of the day pinned down under heavy fire and had taken numerous casualties.   The arrival of the armored column seemed to finally force the enemy to withdraw, although it is also possible that the NVA and VC simply decided that it was time to break off the attack at that point. Whatever the reason, the 48th groups duty officer's log for August 25th reports that contact with the NVA regiment was broken at 2110 hours.   Some of the trucks along the line had fallen into enemy hands during the battle, and enemy soldiers had rifled through them for plunder. Many of the drivers' personal items were taken, including Sonnenberg's camera. At one point when VC and NVA were crawling all over the trucks, the truckers requested permission to call in artillery and blow the enemy troops off the road. The 25th's commander General Williamson denied the request.   Two 105mm gun tubes, obviously too heavy for foot soldiers to handle, were left in place and undamaged. In fact, most of the cargo remained in American hands, and a night defensive perimeter was set up to guard the 25 destroyed vehicles that had to maintain at the ambush site. After the fight ended, trails of white powder were discovered leading away from one of the trucks and into the rubber plantation, signifying that the enemy had escaped with something. Under closer examination, however, the stolen material was found to be nothing more exciting than cake mix. In the following day, the trees were cut back from the road, and the berm was bulldozed flat.   Two Americans were taken prisoner during the ambush. Sp/4 Bobby Louis Johnson of Detroit and Staff Sgt. Kenneth R. Gregory of Altus, Okla., both of the 62nd TC, were captured late in the fight. Rumor had it that these men had been found in the jungle the next day, hanging by their thumbs. Actually, they were held at VC prison camp northwest of Tay Ninh City. Nine months after the battle a 1st Air Cav.  Chopper was flying over northern Tay Ninh Province near the Cambodian border. Twelve miles northwest of Tay Ninh the crew sighted someone waving to them from a trail in the bamboo below. When the pilot descended for a closer look, he decided that the man looked like an American and brought the chopper down to pick him up. It was Sgt. Gregory.   When they picked me up, I was crying, "Gregory was quoted as saying. The trucker had escaped four days earlier and had been wandering in the jungle ever since, praying that a helicopter would fly over. Gregory was taken to the 24th Evac Hospital at Long Binh, where he enjoyed a meal of fried chicken and milk. "It's the best food I've had in a long time," he said. When asked what he missed most while in captivity, he said,"Coffee. The VC don't drink coffee. They like hot sweetened water and tea.   Johnson remained in captivity for five years. In February 1973, he was released along with most other known POW's and sent to Ft. Knox, Ky. I happened to be at Ft. Knox at the time and spoke by telephone with Johnson, comparing our memories of the fight at Ap Nhi. Johnson's thumbs were fine, and his major complaint about his five years with the VC was that he never got enough to eat.   At Ap Nhi, seven drivers were KIA, 10 were WIA and dozens of vehicles were lost. Overall casualty figures for the relief forces eventually committed to the fight were 23 KIA and some 35 WIA. Sp/4 Seay was posthumously awarded the CMH for his actions. Hinote received the Bronze Star for Valor.   Although Ap Nhi was the most costly of the ambushes encountered; there were other black days for the 48th Trans Group. In December, a convoy on its way to Dau Tieng, just north of Tay Ninh, was hit. Lt. James Hammersla of the 10th TC was struck in the back by machine gun fire as he reached for his radio, and he died instantly. He had only recently arrived in Vietnam. In April another 48th convoy came under heavy attack on Highway 13 south of An Loc. Numerous vehicles were damaged or lost, as well as two helicopters.   In a war that lasted years, the ambush at Ap Nhi is perhaps just an obscure incident, remembered only by those whose lives it touched. The Ap Nhi battle has not, however, gone completely unnoticed by historians. The fact that a CMH was awarded for actions in the firefight that followed the ambush has attracted more scholarly attention than such an engagement normally would. Shelby Stanton devotes an entire chapter to convoy battles, including the one at Ap Nhi, in his book The Rise and Fall of an American Army. Ronald Spector provides more detail on the Ap Nhi ambush in his book After Tet.   If the battle is significant in any other way, it is that it successfully tested the Army theorem that all soldiers, regardless of military occupational specialty, are infantrymen first and can fight as such when necessary. The truck drivers who fought at Ap Nhi remembered their training and conducted themselves admirably. Although it was the first real firefight for most of the men, they fought all day with indomitable courage.   The young Americans who died at Ap Nhi spent the last Sunday afternoon of their lives in a place whose name they did not even know. Their story is important because their sacrifice should be remembered.   Now a teacher, Sp/4 Stephen C. Tunnell was a truck driver with the 10th TC, 48th Trans Group, in 1968. He has dedicated this story to Sp/4 William W. Seay, 62nd TC; PFC Arden G. Sonnenberg, 10th TC; PFC Danny Mitchell, 62nd TC; Sp/4 Eugene Turner, 62nd TC; Sp/4 William Lawson, 86th TC; PFC Paul Pirkola, 86th TC; and Sp/5 Claude Vauhn, 86th TC; all of whom lost their lives in the ambush at Ap Nhi.

WORDS FROM THE GUN TRUCKER'S From: BOY Sent: 10/29/2000 5:20 PM Had to sign in as BOY(formaly known as Nomads57). BOY is what the crew of the Justifier called me because of my age(I hope). Have to love them. They helped me to grow and to stay alive with their expierence. Night convoys weren't no fun. Did more night convoys as a driver than as a guntruck crew member. I was real lucky but I was always scared. The Rockpile was an excellant spot for an ambush. But there were alot more. So you never knew when or were you might get hit. Even at night you would sweat like a scalded pig. The dust would cake up on you even at night. You would have to cross the river on a bridge put up by the Engineers. You had to pull up then back up before you could cross the bridge. Then you had to go up the cliff. I have seen 1 lane goat trails wider than QL9. Going thru Sherwood Forest at night was an erie expierence. Shadows can make you see all of sorts of things. Dennis mentioned Feb. 8,1971. At 0130 a POL convoy was being escorted by the "Protector". They were hit by the Rockpile. Lt. Sam Hoskins, Sam Bass, Sgt. Healy. 19 year old Charles Soule was KIA on that truck. A Lt Safford of the 572nd was on board hitching a ride to Khe Sanh. He was also wounded. Of course work went around real quick at Vandergrift about this convoy. Big Al thought that the troops might start refusing to drive at night. He showed up at Vandergrift and gave us all a speech about doing our jobs. He finished up by saying that he knew we would do our jobs because he was ORDERING us to. We did our jobs because I guess we knew lives depended on it. We weren't HEROS just truck drivers. It didn't matter if yu were with the 57th, 572nd, 523rd,528th. You knew that someone, somewhere was depending on you. So we all ate dust and we all looked like ghosts when it caked up on you. From: justifier Sent: 10/30/2000 12:04 PM hello gunner,i remember one night coming back from khe sahn,i can't remember the checkpoint but we were right along the river in a very vulnerable spot one of the trucks in the convoy broke down,it got just dead quit and i remember having a very erie feeling,then all hell broke loose,ak fire broke loose the lt. called in for motar flares,hillbilly the driver of the justifier had to push the disabled truck out of the way so we could get to the fire zone,to this day when i remember that i get a chill up my spine,we were like live bait out thier with lights on and white letttering on the side of the truck.  You know, running that road night after night got to be somewhat tedious. After that first nihgt convoy of Feb. 8, 1971, we were all aware of what the out come could be. Add to that the burned out APC that sat by the side of the road in Sherwood Forest and death was a thought that never really left your mind. Just kinda got pushed to the back till the next night convoy. I do remember taking a picture of some dead VC that were on the side of the road one day. Made you realize how things could turn out. But again you pushed it to the back of your mind. It always came to the forefront when you lost one of yours or you heard of the guys from the other TC units losing one of theirs. I remember one day that we were sitting on top of our bunker at Vadergrift. We (Dennis and myself amongest others)were sitting on top sipping on a beer when the rockets started coming in. TOP went around yelling at everyone to take cover. We told him that the rockets were for the fuel and ammo dumps not our bunker. Anyway the call came out for the "Justifier" to hit the road for a convoy that needed help. As we passed on QL9 in front of our bunker it took a direct hit from a rocket. We lost everything that we had at that time. Dennis lost all his picture albums. At least we didn't lose our lives. On the road rockets were landing all around us. "Red"(NCOIC)told us to duck down in the truck. A rocket hit too close for comfort. "Red" caught some shrapnel from it. Before we got to the convoy the ambush was over so we got turned around. Went and looked at the hole in the ground that used to be our home. Just shook our heads and I think we laughed about how lucky we had been. Had to sleep anywhere we could that night. So even thought the night convoys were dangerous we soon learned that just being there was damgerous to your health. RIP Charles H Soule KIA 2/8/71 Eugene Randollf Kennedy KIA 3/19/71 From: roberson11 Sent: 1/10/2001 6:45 PM Reading Boy and Cherrys' reply sure stirs up some old memories. Heres a article from Stars & Stripes about Rt. 9...  The unit roars out onto the road to Khe Sanh that has already claimed 13 of thier vechicles. The twisting road with its narrow bridges is usually slick with mud. Long stretches run along the edges of deep ravines. There are no guard rails. If it is not raining RT 9 is likely to be a ribbon of choking blinding dust. The men argue about which is worse, the mud or the dust, but it is certain they will drive in one or the other--and sometimes both. Enemy soldiers reguarly ambush convoys on the road. Eight of the units 13 lost vechicles were the targets of red gunners. Rt. 9 is littered with vechicles burnt out and shot up or overturned along the road. Elephant grass and brush line the road along most of its length and often there is high ground on both sides. Every section of the route is susceptible to ambush.    Thats kinda the way it was and we done it at night. Robbie. From: Jess Sent: 1/15/2001 3:03 PM Hello all ! I have been trying to find more info about that firefight out on QL9 back in  april, 1971 seems like a few of you have described  the event that I have been trying to explain/convince my councelor that I have had nightmares about over the past 29+ years .. It brings tears to my eyes and I can feel everyone's pain all over again. I would like to hear from "Boy" "Protector" and anyone else that was on the  guntruck "Protector" that night I was engaged with the enemy on QL9 near Vandergrift. I have spoken to Sam Hoskins and also Jose Garcia and we agree that ..yes this was the incident I have been trying so hard to find information about. Lt. E. Stafford was our LT. from the "Gypsy Bandits" 572nd Trans Co. somehow we got engaged in a firefight and he tried to hitch a ride with he Nam Nomads and was wounded with a direct hit to Nomads Guntruck and I remember the bodies laying along side of the road (injured) Sam Hoskins, Sam Bass, Sgt Healy and did not realize Lt. Stafford had been in that firefight also until I had returned to Quang Tri. I also have learned the name of the dead that evening (early morn) Charly Soule the driver. Who was killed by a direct hit in the door area.     Thanks again anyone from the Protector who saved our lives during this ambush. It would be greatly appriciated and needed if you would contact me personally  Dmild2wild@yahoo.com or reply to this message board.. (Jess) Don Mangus "Mongoose" 572nd Trans Gypsy Bandits. From: BOY Sent: 12/24/2000 7:38 PM I know that I was in several ambushes. I don't think that I can remember anything about them or maybe I won't remember anything. I do know that on several occasions the good Lord intervened on my behalf. QL9 from Vandergrift to Khe Sanh was a road that was made for ambushes. I rememeber the Cobra's overhead firing into the elephant grass right next to the road. I remember one of our POL trucks coming back into Vandergrift with the rear wheels blown off of one axle. I know that I and may others lost good friends up there. Sorry I really can't help on this subject. Want to but just can't. From: 444CC Sent: 12/26/2000 7:55 PM Last night I talked to Charles Sims who was NCOIC of "Satan's Chariot" and asked him to come in here and post an ambush that he was in that I think is kind of unique for several reasons. I will try to relate it and if he comes in he can add or make any corrections. Bn HQ sent "Satan's Chariot" and "Untouchables" out after a broke down truck. It was getting dark and at that time of the war going out after dark on QL19 was not recommended. Instead of securing it on one of the bridges they wanted it brought in. It already had a gun truck with it. As the three guntrucks and the truck started back the bridges were all closed. They called Bn and Bn said that they would call and have the bridges open when they got to each one. They had to stop at each one and it would open up and they would go through. On one of them they stopped and "Satan's Chariot" went through followed by the Unk guntruck and the vehicle. When "Untouchables" started to go onto the bridge all hell broke loose and they pulled the wire accross the bridge. "Untouchables" is outside on one side catching hell and "Satan's Chariot" is locked outside on the other side of the bridge trying to back back on to help their friends. and everyone else is inside. They fought their way clear. What I think is so unique about this one besides poor planning on Bn's part and happening at night in our area is something that kind of stands out to me after analizing it. Charlie had seen how this little convoy was progressing through the bridges and somehow got word down the line to other troops who set this up and carried it out. I think that it shows what kind of communication pipeline charlie had and how fast they could set something up. I hope that Charles comes on here. He can provide more detail on this one.    From: dutchman Sent: 12/27/2000 6:18 PM Had a similar thing happen while I was the driver of the Outlaw. We had to pick up a truck load of people. Can not remember where they were or why it was so important to get them to Qui Nhon. We left Qui Nhon at night and were told that all the bridges were notified that we were coming. We were to stop short of the bridge, flash our lights and they would let us pass. I think at almost every bridge we came to the arvns fired rounds over our heads. At every bridge they pleaded with us to stay and help them guard their bridge. We finally got to the last bridge. After leaving the bridge, not without vigerous pleading to stay, we moved on. We started getting mortar rounds on the road ahead of us so we decided to go back to the bridge. After we turned around and started back, the mortar fire started to plaster the bridge along with small arms fire. Needless to say a u-turn was in order, pretty tricky move on a narrow road , at night, with incoming.Got the Outlaw turned around, put the pedal to the metal and didn't lift until we hit our destination. Found out the next day the people we were supposed to pick up had made it to Qui Nhon the night we left. Luckily no one on the truck was hurt, but what a night!!     Dutchman From: OnrieBrown Sent: 2/4/2001 9:24 AM Gunner, the ambush near Dalat happened while the convoy was going up the pass toward Dalat.  It happened about 9-10 o'clock in the morning.  The convoy commander was in the lead gun jeep.  They didn't know the ambush was going on for some time because of the winding roads on the mountain pass where it occurred.  When they got word, they came back to support.  All four of the persons on the gun jeep were wounded (mostly shrapnel).  The convoy commander called in artillery (155s).  If I remember correctly, there were 24 wounded, 2 kia's and 1 captured, all from the 102nd Engr. Co. and D Co. 815th Engr. Bn..  Some of the wounded were choppered out by medivac.  The ones with minor wounds came back with the convoy.  One of the more seriously wounded was Greg Hedges.  He was driving the 2 1/2 ton that was hit with the B-40.  Not only was he wounded by the shrapnel from the rocket, he caught a AK round through his knee.  Dave Dunlevy was wounded while dragging Greg to safety.  That convoy made the trip to Dalat about every 3rd day to pick up rations and mail.  Check out the pictures under 815th -2 to see Greg Hedges (WIA) and  Keith Albert (POW) at our 102nd reunion.

This page was last updated on: August 30, 2002

AMBUSH